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Abstract—Third-party analysis on private records is becoming increasingly important due to the widespread data collection for various
analysis purposes. However, the data in its original form often contains sensitive information about individuals, and its publication will
severely breach their privacy. In this paper, we present a novel Privacy-preserving Data Analytics framework PDA, which allows a
third-party aggregator to obliviously conduct many different types of polynomial-based analysis on private data records provided by a
dynamic sub-group of users. Notably, every user needs to keep only O(n) keys to join data analysis among O(2n) different groups of
users, and any data analysis that is represented by polynomials is supported by our framework. Besides, a real implementation shows
the performance of our framework is comparable to the peer works who present ad-hoc solutions for specific data analysis
applications. Despite such nice properties of PDA, it is provably secure against a very powerful attacker (chosen-plaintext attack) even
in the Dolev-Yao network model where all communication channels are insecure.
Index Terms—Privacy-preserving Computation, Multi-party Computation, Secure data analysis
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1 INTRODUCTION
Great amount of data is collected for the information-based
decision making in our real life these days (Smart Grid
[25], Social Network Services [19], Location Based Services
[56] etc.). This trend originated from the business needs.
Enterprises have been increasingly looking to discover the
answers to specific business questions from the data they
possess, and various data mining techniques are applied to
derive the answers (e.g., marketing [8] and health care [39]).
Driven by such needs, publication, sharing and analysis
of user-generated data has become common. For exam-
ples, President Information Technology Advisory Commit-
tee (PITAC) released a report to establish a nation-wide
electronic medical records sharing system to share the med-
ical knowledge for various clinic decision making [20]; AOL
published its anonymized query logs for research purpose
[5]; Netflix released anonymized dataset containing 500,000
subscribers’ movie ratings to organize a public contest for
the best recommendation algorithm [7]. However, user-
generated data in its original form contains much sensitive
information about individuals ([2], [24]), and the publication
of such data has brought active discussions in both industry
and academia [15], [18], [45]. Current primary practice is
to rely on 1) sanitization to clean up the sensitive informa-
tion in the publication [33], or 2) regulation enforcement
to restrict the usage of the published data [34], [37]. The
former approach may bring distortion to the data during
the sanitization which leads to accuracy loss, and the latter
one solely relies on the legal or voluntary agreements that
the data should be used only for agreed purposes. The
drawback of those protections is two folds. 1) A good trade-
off between the utility and the privacy is hard to find; 2)
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Even if data recipients do not misbehave on the data, such
protection does not guarantee the protection, in the sense
that a profitable sensitive data may become the target of
various types of attacks, and the contracts or agreements
cannot guarantee any protection in this case.
Various previous works focus on the data anonymization
[46], [50] to protect the identities of the data owners, but
the de-anonymization [26], [29] is its powerful countermea-
sure, and it cannot provably guarantee individual privacy.
In this paper, we focus on a more substantial aspect of
privacy implications in the third-party data analysis – the
confidentiality of the data itself. We investigate the privacy
preserving data analysis problem in which a third-party
aggregator wants to perform data analysis on a private
dataset generated by any subgroup of total users in the
system, where the total users in the system may change
dynamically. To enable this without privacy concerns, it is
desirable to have a data analysis tool which can provably
guarantee the data privacy without bringing distortion to
the analysis result such that the aggregator will get the most
utility out of it. Various types of solutions based on different
techniques are proposed to support such privacy preserving
computation (secure multi-party computation, functional
encryption, perturbation etc., all reviewed in Section 8), but
we have the following design goals to make our scheme
applicable in a realistic environment, and most of existing
solutions fail to achieve one or more goals.
Design Goals
Varieties: Two varieties need to be considered. In reality,
the actual group of users generating data changes rapidly
along the time, and the type of analysis itself also changes
depending on the characteristics of the dataset. Therefore, a
scheme needs to adapt itself to such two varieties.
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2Time-series Data: Users continuously generate data, there-
fore the data analysis scheme should preserve the data
confidentiality even when the data is a time series and may
be substantially self-correlated.
Communication & Computation Overhead: Considering
the rate at which data is generated and collected these days,
the analysis on the published data should be efficient in
terms of both computation and communication overhead.
Channel Security: In dynamic environments such as
VANET, establishing pair-wise secure channels is almost
impossible due to the huge overhead. Therefore a scheme
cannot rely on secure channels to achieve privacy.
Privacy-requirement Independent Accuracy: Distorted re-
sult is not accepted in many cases, therefore we require
accurate result with zero or negligible distortion from the
published data, which is not a function of the guaranteed
privacy level. This property will enable us to guarantee the
proposed security (IND-CPA) all the time, hence trade-off
between the security and utility is unnecessary.
In this paper, we design a framework for Privacy-
preserving Data analytics (PDA), a cryptographic tool
which enables third-party analysis on private data records
without privacy leakages. The main contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows.
1) Instead of presenting ad-hoc solutions for many appli-
cations, PDA enables any type of data analysis that is
based on polynomials (e.g., statistics calculation [55], re-
gression analysis, and support vector machine classifi-
cation) to be performed on a private dataset distributed
among individuals.
2) We propose a provably secure cryptographic frame-
work which guarantees semantic security against
chosen-plaintext attack. Specifically, any polynomial
adversary’s advantage is polynomially bounded by the
advantage of solving a Decional Deffie-Hellman prob-
lem.
3) Although we support many different formats of
polynomial-based data analysis among any subset of n
users, every user needs to hold only O(n) keys, and the
computation & communication complexities for adding
an extra user to existing group of n users are both
O(n) while removing an existing user does not require
extra operation. Besides, on average the communication
overhead for an ordinary user is less than 1 KB per
product term in the polynomial.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Notations
We use ZN to denote the additive group {0, 1, · · · , N − 1},
and Z∗N to denote the invertible residues modulo N . Also,
|G| and |P| are used to denote the order of group G
and the size of the set P respectively. Recall that, given
the conventional notation of Euler’s totient function φ(N),
|Z∗N | = φ(N). When demonstrating the reducibility between
the computation problems X,Y , we use X ≤P Y to denote
thatX is polynomially reducible to Y , andX ≡ Y to denote
that X is polynomially equivalent to Y .
Definition 1. k-th Decisional Diffie-Hellman (k-DDH) prob-
lem in the group Z∗N with generator g is to decide whether
(gk)c = (gk)ab given a triple ((gk)a, (gk)b, (gk)c), and any al-
gorithm A’s advantage in solving the k-DDH problem is denoted
by advk−DDHA .
Definition 2. A number w is called N -th residue modulo N2 if
there exists y ∈ Z∗N2 such that w = yN = mod N2.
Recall that the set of N -th residues modulo N2 is a cyclic
multiplicative subgroup of Z∗N2 of order φ(N). Every N -th
residue has N roots, and specifically, the set of all N -th roots
of the identity element forms a cyclic multiplicative group
{(1 +N)x = 1 + xN mod N2|x ∈ ZN} of order N .
Lemma 1. There exists a function
D : {(1 +N)x mod N2|x ∈ ZN} → ZN
which can efficiently solve the discrete logarithm within the
subgroup of Z∗N2 generated by g = 1 +N .
Proof. For any y = (1 +N)x, y = (1 + xN) mod N2. Then,
the function D(y) = (y − 1)/N = x efficiently solves the
discrete logarithm within the subgroup, where ‘(y − 1)/N ’
is the quotient of the integer division (y − 1)/N rather than
y − 1 times the inverse of N .
Definition 3. Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) problem
in the group of N -th residues modulo N2 with generator g is to
decide whether a given element x ∈ NRN2 is an N -th residue
modulo N2.
2.2 Computational Assumptions
N is an RSA modulus of two safe prime numbers p, q
(N = pq, and p, q satisfy p = 2p′ + 1, q = 2q′ + 1 for some
large prime numbers p′, q′ [14]). Then, the DDH assumption
states that if the factorization of N is unknown, the DDH
problem in Z∗N is intractable [10], [35]. That is, for any
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm (PPTA) A, advDDHA
is a negligible function of the security parameter κ.
Lemma 2. When N is a semiprime of two safe prime numbers
p, q and the factorization N = pq remains unknown, we have
DDH ≤P k-DDH.
Proof. Given an oracle solves k-DDH problem, if one knows
k, he can submit ((ga)k, (gb)k, (gc)k) to this oracle. gc = gab
if and only if the oracle outputs 1.
Under the same condition, the DCR assumption states
that the DCR problem in Z∗N2 is believed to be intractable
if the factorization of N = pq is unknown [52]. That is, for
any PPTA A, advDCRA is a negligible function of the security
pararmeter. In this paper, we rely on the above assumptions
to define and prove the security.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
3.1 Problem Modelling
W.l.o.g., we assume there are total n users, and each of them
is represented by an integer ID:i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. Each user
generates time-series data records xi,t at time t, but we use
xi to denote his data value for visual comfort. A third-party
aggregator wishes to choose an arbitrary subset of users
3P ⊆ {1, · · · , n} to conduct certain data analysis on their
private data records by evaluating:
f(xP) =
∑
k
ck
( ∏
i∈P
xeikik
)
(1)
where xik is user i’s private value for the k-th product term∏
xeikik , and we call P as the participants of the polynomial
evaluation. Note that Eq.(1) can be used to represent any
general multivariate polynomial because the coefficients
ck’s and the exponents eik’s are tunable parameters.
To model the time-variation, we use a discrete time
domain T = {t1, t2, · · · } of time slots, and when the ag-
gregator submits the query polynomial to users, he will also
declare a sequential time window Tf ⊂ T associated with
the polynomial in order to request users’ data generated
during the time window Tf .
3.2 Informal Threat Assumptions
Due to privacy concerns, the analytic result should be
only given to the aggregator, and any user’s data should
be kept secret to anyone else but the owner unless it is
deducible from the polynomial value. Besides, both users
and the aggregator are assumed to be passive and adaptive
adversaries. They are passive in that they will not tamper
the correct computation of the protocol. If users tamper the
protocol, it is highly likely that the aggregator will detect
it since the outcome of the protocol will not be in a valid
range (e.g., mean age= 3, 671.9) due to the cryptographic
operations on large integers, and the aggregator is interested
in the correct analytic result, so they will not tamper the
protocol itself. Furthermore, users may report a value with
small deviation such that the analytic result still ‘looks’
good due to many reasons (moral hazards, unintentional
mistake, etc.), but evaluating the reliability of the reported
value is out of this paper’s scope. On the other hand, they
are adaptive in that they may produce their public values
adaptively after seeing others’ public values (i.e., passive
rushing attack [30]). Besides, we also assume the users will
not collude with each other or the aggregator in our basic
construction, and this assumption will be relaxed in the
advanced version in the later section.
As aforementioned, we assume the Dolev-Yao network
model. That is, all the communication channels are open
to anyone, and anyone can overhear and synthesize any
message. This is a reasonable assumption since in a dynamic
network environment in which actual group of available
users may change (e.g., sensor networks, crowdsourcing
environment), establishing pairwise secure communication
channels is costly and may not be possible due to limited
resources.
3.3 Privacy-preserving Data Analytics: PDA
To formally define the correctness and the security of our
framework, we first present a precise definition of PDA.
Definition 4. Our Privacy-preserving Data Analytics
(PDA) is the collection of the following four polynomial time
algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encode, and Aggregate.
Setup(1κ) → params is a probabilistic setup algorithm that is
run by a crypto server to generate system-wide public parameters
params given a security parameter κ as input.
KeyGen(params)
dist.−−−→ {EK1,EK2, · · · ,EKn} is a probabilistic
and distributed algorithm jointly run by the users. Each user i
will secretly receive his own secret key EKi.
Encode(xik, f(·),EKi, Tf ) → C(xik) is a deterministic algo-
rithm run by each user i to encode his private value xik into a
communication string C(xik) using tk ∈ Tf . The output C(xik)
is published in an insecure channel.
Aggregate({C(xik)|∀k, ∀i ∈ P}) → f(xP) =
∑
(ck
∏
xeikik )
is run by the aggregator to aggregates all the encoded private
values {C(xik)}’s to calculate f(xP).
We use ‘Encode’ and ‘Aggregate’ instead of conventional
terminologies ‘Encrypt’ and ‘Decrypt’ because we will em-
ploy a homomorphic encryption as a black-box algorithm
later.
Definition 5. PDA is correct if for all P ⊆ {1, · · · , n}:
Pr
 params← Setup(1κ);{EKi}ni=1 ← KeyGen(params);∀k,∀i : C(xik)← Encode(xik, f(xP),EKi, Tf );
Aggregate({C(xik)|∀k,∀i}) = f(xP)
 = 1
where the probabilities are taken over all random bits consumed
by the probabilistic algorithms.
The security of PDA is formally defined via following
data publishing game.
Data Analysis Game:
Setup: 3 disjoint time domains are chosen: T1 for phase
1, T2 for phase 2, and Tc for the challenge phase.
Init: The adversary declares his role in the PDA scheme
(i.e., aggregator or user), and the challenger controls the
remaining participants. Both of them engage themselves in
the Setup and KeyGen algorithms.
Phase 1 in T1: The adversary submits polynomially
many calls to the encode oracle1 based on arbitrary query
(f(x), Tf ⊆ T1, {xik}i∈P,k). If the declared time windows
do not overlap with each other, he receives all correspond-
ing communication strings from the oracle. Otherwise, he
receives nothing.
Challenge in Tc: The adversary declares the target poly-
nomial f∗(xP) to be challenged as well as its time window
Tf∗ ⊆ Tc. Then, he submits two sets of values xP1,xP,2,
such that f∗(xP,1) = f∗(xP,2), to the challenger. The
challenger flips a fair binary coin b and generate the corre-
sponding communication strings based on xP,b, which are
given to the adversary.
Phase 2 in T2: Phase 1 is repeated adaptively, but the
time window Tf should be chosen from T2.
Guess: The adversary gives a guess b′ on b.
The advantage of an algorithm A in this game is defined
as advPDAA =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b] − 12 ∣∣. Intuitively, we assumed
the worst-case scenario (i.e., most powerful attacker) in the
above game where even an adversarial user can also specify
the target polynomial to be evaluated, and the polynomial
can be chosen adaptively to increase the advantage. In real-
life applications, polynomials are chosen by the aggregator
1. The oracle generates and gives the communication strings at the
adversary’s request based on the queried polynomial f(xP), its asso-
ciated time window Tf , and the input values {xik}i∈P,k. Challenger
can act as such encode oracle in this game for the users that are not
under adversary’s control.
4only, and the choice will be monitored by the users since the
coefficients and powers are public.
Definition 6. Our PDA is indistinguishable against chosen-
plaintext attack (IND-CPA) if all polynomial time adversaries’
advantages in the above game are of a negligible function w.r.t.
the security parameter κ when T1, T2, and Tc are three disjoint
time domains.
Note that our security definition does not guarantee
that the private values cannot be deduced from the output
values. Even a perfectly secure black-box algorithm cannot
guarantee it if the same set of k values are fed as inputs for
k different polynomials’ evaluation (a simple linear system).
Rather, we use IND-CPA to define the security which is
shown to be equivalent to the semantic security [36]. In
other words, our framework guarantees that any adver-
sary’s knowledge (either adversarial aggregator or user) on
the probability distribution of the private values remains
unchanged even if he has access to all the communication
strings generated by our PDA. The indistinguishability
becomes particularly crucial when the data is generated
continuously along the time, and the same user’s data may
be temporally correlated. Unless guaranteed by the semantic
security, the data privacy is hardly preservable.
4 ACHIEVING CORRECT & SECURE PDA
In this section, we first present a basic construction with-
out colluding users for simplicity, and further presents the
countermeasure to collusion attacks in Section 7.3.
4.1 Intuitions
The following two steps show the big sketch of our design
on the oblivious polynomial evaluation.
Hiding each value: To hide every private value xik ∈ ZN
in the polynomial f(xP) (Eq.1), we let each user i publish
the perturbed data xikrik, where rik is an independently
chosen random noise, but it satisfies that
∏
i∈P rik = 1 with
modulo operation using our novel secret sharing technique.
It follows that the product of all perturbed data is equal to∏
i xik for all k.
Hiding each product term: To hide the product terms in Eq.
(1), we employ two users with special roles. The first special
user i1 will publish homomorphically encrypted perturbed
data E(xi1kri1k) instead of his perturbed data using the
aggregator’s key. Since the plaintext of this ciphertext is a
perturbed data, the aggregator does not learn xi1k. On the
other hand, because only the aggregator has the private key
of the ciphertext, no one else learns xi1k or
∏
i xik either
2.
The second user i2 does not publish his perturbed data
either. Instead, he conducts homomorphic operations:
E(xi1kri1k)
∏
i6=i1 xikrik = E(
∏
i
xik)
for all k, where E(m) denotes the ciphertext of m en-
crypted with a homomorphic encryption scheme. Then, he
locally picks random numbers Kk such that
∏
k Kk = 1
(modulo operation), and publishes perturbed ciphertexts
KkE(
∏
i xik) to the aggregator. The product of them is equal
2. Not all xiri terms are published, therefore the product of pub-
lished perturbed data does not yield
∏
i xik
to E(
∑
k
∏
i xik), and only the aggregator can decrypt it
because other users do not have the private key. On the
other hand, the aggregator cannot obtain values of any
single product term because the ciphertexts are perturbed.
Letting the users independently obtaining random
noises rik such that
∏
i∈P rik = 1 is the most challenging
part. To do so, we exploit the sequential time window Tf
associated with the polynomial f(·). All users will pick the
k-th time slot tk in Tf to generate rik for his xik. Since the
random noise is based on tk, we need different time slots
for all product terms. This implies we have to consume Tf
of size m for a polynomial f with m product terms. Also, all
sequential time windows for the evaluation must be disjoint
to each other to guarantee that no time slots are used for
twice.
4.2 Constructions
Firstly, we define the Lagrange coefficient for i ∈ Zn and a
set, P , of integers in Zn as Li,P(x) =
∏
j∈P
j 6=i
x−j
i−j , and use
the simplified Lagrange coefficient Li,P for a special case
Li,P(0) for the visual comfort.
Then, our provably secure framework PDA works as
follows. Note that modular operations are omitted unless
necessary for the sake of simplicity.
Setup
A crypto server picks two safe semiprimes N = pq, N˜ = p˜q˜
such that p, q are of same length, p˜, q˜ are of same length κ
bits, and φ(N)/N˜ = k is an integer. Then, he randomly picks
a generator g of the group Z∗N , a generator g˜ of Z∗N˜ , and sets
h = gk. Subsequently, he randomly chooses a hash function
H : Z→ 〈h〉, which is modelled as a random oracle. Finally,
he publishes params = (g, g˜, N, N˜ ,H) and destroys p, q, p˜, q˜
such that they are no longer available.
Lemma 3. hN˜ = 1 mod N .
Proof. hN˜ = gkN˜ = gφ(N) = 1 mod N
Any party independent from aggregator or users is
qualify as the crypto server, for example, Internet Service
Providers or governments.
Key Generation
Aggregator’s Key Generation: The aggregator generates a
pair of additive homomorphic encryption keys PK,SK, and
publishes PK only. This additive homomorphic encryption
must have the following properties:
EPK(m1) · EPK(m2) = EPK(m1 +m2)
EPK(m1)m2 = EPK(m1m2)
where EPK(m) denotes the ciphertext of m encrypted with
PK. Any additive homomorphic encryption with message
space ZN is accepted (e.g., Paillier’s cryptosystem [52]).
Users’ Key Generation: All users participate in the follow-
ing secret sharing.
1) Every user i (i ∈ {1, · · · , n}) randomly picks ri ∈ Z∗N˜ ,
and broadcasts yi = g˜ri ∈ Z∗N˜ via insecure channel.
2) Then, every user i uses yi+1 and yi−1 to locally calcu-
late Yi = (yi+1 ·y−1i−1)ri ∈ Z∗N˜ , where the inverse is over
modulo N˜ . Specially, user 1 uses y2 and yn, and user n
uses y1 and yn−1.
5Lemma 4.
∏n
i=1 Yi = 1 mod N˜ ,
∏n
i=1 Y
N˜
i = 1 mod N˜
2
Proof.
n∏
i=1
Yi = g˜
(r2−rn)r1 · · · g˜(r1−rn−1)rn = g˜0 = 1 mod N˜
Then,
∏n
i=1 Yi = 1 + mN˜ for some integer m, and∏n
i=1 Y
N˜
i = (1 +mN˜)
N˜ = 1 mod N˜2 as in Section 2.1.
Subsequently, every user j randomly defines a polyno-
mial q(d)j (x) over Z∗N˜ , whose degree is d and the constant
term is 0 (i.e., q(d)j (0) = 0). That is, every user randomly
picks the coefficients for its own polynomial from Z∗
N˜
.
This is repeated for all d = 2, · · · , n − 1. Then, each user
i executes the encoding key query (Sub-Algorithm 1), in
which all other users jointly interact with him to respond
to the query. The query outputs the specific data points
on the secret global polynomials q(2)(x), · · · , q(n−1)(x) for
each user, where the global polynomial is the sum of all
individual polynomials.
Sub-Algorithm 1 EKi Query
1: Every user j 6= i computes and publishes
Qij = Y
N˜
j (1 + N˜)
q
(d)
j (i) mod N˜2
2: After seeing all the broadcasts, user i calculates:
Y N˜i (1 + N˜)
q
(d)
i (i)
∏
j 6=i
Qij = (1 + N˜)
∑n
j=1 q
(d)
j (i) mod N˜2
Subsequently, he uses aforementioned discrete loga-
rithm solver D(·) to solve q(d)(i) = ∑j q(d)j (i) mod N˜
from it, which is set as one of his encoding keys. Later,
q(d)(i) will be used to generate the data masker when
d+ 1 users’ data is to be analyzed.
Step 1 & 2 are repeated for d = 2, · · · , n− 1.
Output: EKi(q(2)(i), · · · , q(n−1)(i))
Essentially, in the user’s key generation, each user j ran-
domly generates polynomials q(2)j (x), · · · , q(n−1)j (x) to re-
spond others’ key queries, and each key recipient i receives
one data point for each secret polynomial q(d)(i), where the
polynomial q(d)(x) remains unknown to everyone because
it is merely the sum of all users’ random polynomials.
However, specific point on this unknown polynomial can
be jointly computed as shown in the query.
Lemma 5. For any set of users P , we have:∑
i∈P
q(|P|−1)(i)Li,P = 0 mod N˜
Proof. Recall that the constant terms in all polynomials are
0. Then, due to the polynomial interpolation, the above sum
equals q(|P|−1)(0) = 0 mod N˜ .
Input Encoding
Recall that we employ two users with special roles. For the
simplicity of the presentation, we assume that the first two
users (user 1 & 2) have to participate in the polynomial eval-
uation and act as the special users, but any other ordinary
user can replace them.
After the aggregator declares the target polynomial
f(xP) =
∑
k ck
(∏
i x
eik
ik
)
as well as the corresponding
time window Tf , all users examine the time window. If
Tf overlaps with any of the consumed time windows, all
users abort. Otherwise, every user i ∈ P except user 1 & 2
computes and publishes his encoded value C(xik) for all k:
∀k : C(xik) = xeikik H(tk)q
(|P|−1)(i)Li,P ∈ Z∗N 3
where tk is the k-th time slot in Tf . At the same time, user 2
computes and publishes:
∀k : EPK
(
C(x2k)
)
∈ Z∗N2
Subsequently, user 1 computes C(x1k)’s for himself and
computes all Vk’s for the product terms as shown below:
∀k : Vk = EPK
(
C(xe2k2k )
)∏
i∈P,i6=2 C(x
eik
ik )
= EPK
( ∏
i∈P
xeikik
)
Subsequently, he randomly selects Kk ∈ Z∗N2 such that∏
k Kk = 1 mod N2, and he publishes KkV ckk for all k.
Even if a user i’s xik does not appear in a product term∏
xeikik , he still sets xik = 1 and participates in the analysis
by following the algorithm to guarantee the correctness of
the final aggregation.
Aggregation
When all users finish their encoding and broadcasting, the
aggregator conducts the following homomorphic opera-
tions:∏
k
KkV ckk = EPK
(∑
k
ck
( ∏
i∈P
xeikik
))
mod N2
Then, he can use SK to decrypt the polynomial value.
analysis in the appendix show that PDA is correct and
indistinguishable against chosen-plaintext attack. Note that
the lowest degree in a user’s encoding key EKi is 2, and this
forces at least three users to participate in the polynomial
evaluation. This is because our scheme cannot guarantee
the data privacy against other users when only two users
participate in the evaluation (Section 7.5).
4.3 Supporting Dynamic User Group
Up to this point, our design is able to support data analysis
in dynamic subgroup of a fixed group of n users. A more
substantial ability is to support a dynamic group of users,
i.e., to enable new users to join the system and old users to
leave the system.
Adding a new user n+ 1
When a new user whose ID is n+ 1 needs to join the group
of users {1, · · · , n}, the number of participants in one round
of data analysis can be as large as n + 1. The first step to
do is to update the key set of every user i in the old group
{1, · · · , n}: each user i needs to acquire and add one extra
3. C(xik) may not be in Z∗N when xik is not invertible under modulo
N , but this occurs only when xik is not co-prime to n, i.e., xik is equal
to p or q, two large safe prime numbers. The chance this happens
is 1
pq
, and this is also the case where the large RSA number n is
factorized. We simply ignored this chance because it is a negligible
function of the security parameter, and it is also commonly believed
that the factorization is intractable.
6item q(n)(i) into his key set EKi for the worst case where
all of n + 1 users participate in the analysis (so that their
q(n)(i)’s can be used when such case occurs). The second
step is to issue the new user n + 1 his full key set EKn+1 =
{q(2)(n + 1), · · · , q(n−1)(n + 1), q(n)(n + 1)} so that he can
participate in any data analysis consisting of 2, 3, · · · , n+ 1
participants.
For the first step, all users in the new group perform
the aforementioned secret sharing in the Key Generation,
and every user j ∈ {1, · · · , n+ 1} randomly defines q(n)j (x)
whose degree is n and the constant term is 0. Then, for each
user i ∈ {1, · · · , n+1}, every user j 6= i computes and pub-
lishes Qij of degree n as in Sub-algorithm 1, and i calculates
q(n)(i) in the same way. When this is repeated for all users,
every user i in the old group {1, · · · , n} has a complete
key set which contains key items q(2)(i), · · · , q(n)(i), and
the new user n+ 1 only has q(n)(n+ 1).
For the second step, every user j 6= i performs the
following process for d = 2, · · · , n − 1. User j re-uses
his previously defined individual polynomial q(d)j (x) to
calculate q(d)j (n + 1) and publishes Qn+1,j of degree d as
in Sub-algorithm 1. Subsequently, user n + 1 calculates the
product and acquire the q(d)(n+ 1) in the same way. When
this is repeated for d = 2, · · · , n − 1, the new user acquires
q(2)(n+ 1), · · · , q(n−1)(n+ 1).
Finally, 2n+ 1 new items are shared among n+ 1 users,
and every user i in the new group has his own n+1 items in
the key set EKi, which is the full key set for the new group
of users {1, · · · , n+ 1}.
Adding n′ new users
Batch arrival can be handled in a similar way. When n′
new users arrive at the same time, one round of secret
sharing occurs in the new group of n + n′ users. As the
first step, n′ extra key items q(n)(i), · · · , q(n+n′−1)(i) are
delivered to every i ∈ {1, · · · , n + n′}. Then, as the second
step, every new user i ∈ {n + 1, · · · , n + n′} acquires
q(2)(i), · · · , q(n−1)(i) as aforementioned.
Removing one or more existing users
When one or more users are removed or leave the group,
the system can simply ignore the removed users, and keys
of the rest users are not affected by the removal.
4.4 Representing Real Numbers
Due to the cryptographic operations, all the computations
and operations in our scheme are closed in integer groups,
and thus we need to use integers to represent real numbers.
We exploit the homomorphism in PDA to represent real
numbers via integers using the fixed point representation
[51]. Given a real number x, its fixed point representation is
given by [x] = bx · 2ec for a fixed e, and all the arithmetic
operations reduce to the integer versions as follows:
• Addition/Subtraction: [x± y] = [x]± [y]
• Multiplication/Division : [x · y±1] = [x] · [y]±1 · 2∓e
where x · 2−1 stands for x divided by 2. Then, we have the
following conversions for the arithmetic operations used in
our schemes if using fixed point representations.
• C([x])C([y])⇒ C([x])C([y]) · 2−e.
• EPK([x])[y] ⇒ EPK([x])[y]·2−e
where C(m) is the encoded communication string of [m]
(Encode algorithm), and EPK(m) denotes the ciphertext
of m encrypted with PK (Key Generation algorithm). We
do not use floating point representation because it is hard
to implement the arithmetic operations on floating point
numbers. Although this conversion gives practically high
precision, one may consider employing [3], [32] for much
higher precisions.
4.5 Data Analysis via PDA: Examples
We only present some examples in this section since in-
finitely many different analysis are supported and it is not
possible to enumerate all of them here, but any data analysis
based on polynomials can be conducted via our framework.
Statistics Calculation: Various statistical values including,
but not limited to mean, variance, sample skewness, mean
square weighted deviation are all polynomials of the data
values, and all of them can be privately evaluated by a
third-party aggregator without knowing individual data by
leveraging our PDA.
Regression Analysis: Regression analysis is a statistical
process for estimating the relationship among the variables.
Widely used polynomial regression and ridge regression
both belong to it. In both, each user i’s data record is
described as a feature vector x and a dependent variable
yi, and training a regression model is to find p which min-
imizes MSE(p) =
∑
i(yi − pxi)2, i.e., the linear predictor
who predicts users’ dependent variable vector y using their
feature matrix X with minimum mean squared error. Since
MSE(p) is convex, it is minimized if and only if Ap = b,
where A = XTX and b = XTy. Further, A =
∑
i xix
T
i ,
and b =
∑
i yixi. Therefore, the aggregator can obliviously
evaluate them with several calls to our PDA. Note that any
polynomial regression model or ridge regression model can
be trained in the same way.
Support Vector Machine: Support Vector Machine (SVM) is
a supervised learning model which is widely used to classify
the data records. Similar to the regression analysis, a user
i’s data record is described as a feature vector xi and its
class yi ∈ {−1, 1}, and training a SVM is to find a vector
w and a constant b such that the hyperplane wx − b = 0
separates the records having yi = −1 from those having
yi = 1 with the maximum margin 2|w| . The dual form of this
optimization problem is represented as maximizing L(a) in
a = {a1, · · · , an}:
L(a) =
n∑
i=1
ai − 1
2
∑
i,j
aiajyiyjx
T
i xj
subject to
∑n
i=1 aiyi = 0 and 0 ≤ ai ≤ C. This is solved
by the Sequential Minimum Optimization (SMO) algorithm
[53] with user-defined tolerance, who greedily seeks for the
local maximum iteratively until convergence with certain
error. Due to the equality constraint, L(a) becomes a one-
dimensional concave quadratic function in each iteration,
which can be trivially optimized. The coefficients of the
quadratic function are polynomials of all users’ feature
vectors and class values, and the aggregator can obliviously
calculate them using our framework and optimize L(a) at
each iteration locally.
75 CORRECTNESS & SECURITY PROOFS
5.1 Correctness Proof
Theorem 1. Our PDA is correct.
Proof. We show by steps that each algorithm correctly cal-
culates the output, which guarantees the correctness of our
scheme.
Key Generation: Correctness of the homomorphic encryption
is already shown [52], therefore we focus on the user’s key
generation. Due to Lemma 4, we have:
Y N˜i (1 + N˜)
q
(d)
i (i)
∏
j 6=i
Qij = (
n∏
j=1
Y N˜j )(1 + N˜)
∑n
j=1 q
(d)
j (i)
= (1 + N˜)
∑n
j=1 q
(d)
j (i) mod N˜2
Further, the existence of the discrete logarithm solver
(Lemma 1) guarantees that the discrete logarithm will be
correctly calculated.
Input Encoding
User 1 conducts the following computation in the input
encoding:
∀j : Vj = EPK
(
C(x
e2j
2 )
)∏
i∈P,i6=2 C(x
eij
i )
= EPK
( ∏
i∈P
C(x
eij
i )
)
= EPK
(
H(tk)
0
∏
i∈P
xeikik
)
= EPK
( ∏
i∈P
xeikik
)
The first two equations are true because of the additive
homomorphism of the encryption EPK(·), and the third
equation is true because:∑
i∈P
q(|P|−1)(i)Li,P(0) = 0 mod N˜ (Lemma 5)
⇒ H(t)
∑
i∈P q
(|P|−1)(i)Li,P(0) = (ht)0 mod N (Lemma 3)
Correctness of the aggregation algorithm is obvious. In
conclusion, after all Setup,KeyGen,Encode are executed, the
output of Aggregate is f(xP) with probability 1.
5.2 Security Proof
To prove the indistinguishability (IND-CPA) of our PDA,
we first prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 6. In the KeyGen algorithm, Yi is statistically indistin-
guishable from a uniformly random element chosen from Z∗
N˜
.
Proof. In the first secret-sharing phase, every user publishes
yi = g˜
ri where ri is randomly chosen, but since DDH
problem is believed to be intractable in ZN˜ when the fac-
torization of N˜ is unknown, g˜ri is indistinguishable from
a uniformly random element chosen from ZN˜ as shown in
[10].
Lemma 7. In the KeyGen algorithm, any secret data point q(d)j (i)
remains statistically indistinguishable from a uniform randomly
chosen element, and all the encoding keys are indistinguishable
from uniform randomly chosen elements.
Proof. In the EKi Query (Sub-Algorithm 1) phase, every user
i except user j publishes Qij = Y N˜j (1 + N˜)
q
(d)
j (i). We show
that Qij leaks no statistical information about the hidden
random polynomial q(d)j (i) as follows.
We first prove that, given m and y = Y N˜j (1 + N˜)
m
only (except Yj), deciding whether m is the correspond-
ing hidden value in y (denoted as D-Hidden problem) is
equivalent to the DCR problem. We suppose there is an
oracle OD−Hidden who can solve the D-Hidden problem,
and another oracle ODCR who can solve the DCR problem.
D-Hidden ≤P DCR: Since (1 + N˜) is an N˜ -th non-
residue, y is an N˜ -th residue if and only if m = 0 mod N˜ .
Then, given y and m, one can submit y(1 + N˜)−m to ODCR
to see if it is an N˜ -th residue to decide whether m is the
hidden value.
DCR ≤P D-Hidden: Similarly, given x in the DCR prob-
lem (deciding if x is an N˜ -th residue), one can submit m = 0
and x to OD−Hidden to see if m = 0 is the corresponding
hidden value in x to see whether x is an N˜ -th residue or not.
Therefore, deciding whether m is a hidden value in
y is exactly as hard as the DCR problem. Due to the
same theory, given two known messages m0,m1 as well
as y = Y N˜j (1 + N˜)
mb , deciding which message is the
corresponding hidden value is exactly as hard as the DCR
problem, which concludes the semantic security of Qij
against chosen-plaintext attack.
Due to the semantic security of Qij , each user’s individ-
ual polynomial value is statistically indistinguishable from
a uniform random element, and therefore any encoding key
q(d)(i) of any user i is indistinguishable from an element
uniform randomly chosen from Z∗
N˜
since it’s the sum of all
individual polynomial values.
With the above lemmas, we are ready to present the
proof for the following theorem.
Theorem 2. With the DDH assumption and DCR assumption,
our PDA scheme is indistinguishable against chosen-plaintext
attack (IND-CPA) under the random oracle model. Namely, for
any PPTA A, its advantage advPDAA in the Data Analysis Game
is bounded as follows:
advPDAA ≤ e(qc + 1)
2
qc
· advDDHA
where e is the base of the natural logarithm and qc is the number
of queries to the encode oracle.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we present three relevant
games Game 1, Game 2, and Game 3, in which we use A
and B to denote the adversary and the challenger. For each
l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote El as the event that B outputs 1 in
the Game l, and we define advl = |Pr[El]− 12 |.
Game 1: This is the game exactly identical to the Data
Publishing Game in Section 3.3. A’s encode queries (f(x),
Tf , {xik}i,k) are answered by returning the encode val-
ues {C(xik)}i,k. In the challenge phase, the adversary A
selects a target polynomial f∗(x), the associated time win-
dow Tf∗ , and two set of values xP,1,xP,2 which satisfy
f∗(xP,1) = f∗(xP,2). Then, the challenger B returns the
corresponding encoded values to the adversary A. When
the game terminates, B outputs 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
By the definition, adv1 = |Pr[E1]− 12 | = advPDAA .
Game 2: This game occurs after the Game 1 terminates.
In Game 2, the adversary A and the challenger B repeat the
8same operations as in Game 1 using the same time windows
of those operations. However, for each encode query in
Game 1 at time t ∈ T1 ∪ T2, the challenger B flips a biased
binary coin µTf for the entire time window Tf which takes
1 with probability 1qc+1 and 0 with probability
qc
qc+1
. When
the Game 2 terminates, B checks whether any µTf = 1. If
there is any, B outputs a random bit. Otherwise, B outputs
1 if b′ = b and 0 if b′ 6= b. If we denote F as the event that
µTf = 1 for any Tf , the same analysis as in [21] shows that
Pr[F ] = 1e(qc+1) . According to [40], Game 1 to Game 2 is a
transition based on a failure event of large probability, and
therefore we have adv2 = adv1Pr[F ] = adv1e(qc+1) .
Game 3: In this game, the adversary A and the chal-
lenger B repeat the same operations as in Game 1 using
the same time windows of those operations. However,
there is a change in the answers to the encode queries
(f(x), Tf , {xik}i,k). The oracle will respond to the query
with the following encoded values:
∀i,∀k : C(xik) =
x
eik
ik H(tk)
q(|P|−1)(i)Li,P(0) µTf = 1
xeikik
(
H(tk)
s
)q(|P|−1)(i)Li,P(0)
µTf = 0
where s is a uniform randomly chosen element from ZN˜
fixed for each polynomial f(x), i.e., the same polynomial
has the same s. When Game 3 terminates, B outputs 1 if
b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
Due to the Lemma 8 below, distinguishing Game 3
from Game 2 is at least as hard as a DDH problem for
any adversary A in Game 2 or Game 3. It follows then:∣∣∣Pr[E2] − Pr[E3]∣∣∣ ≤ advDDHA . The answers to encode
queries in Game 3 are identical to those of Game 2 with
probability 1qc+1 and different from those of Game 2 with
probability qcqc+1 . In the latter case, due to the random ele-
ment s, C(xik) is uniformly distributed in the subgroup of
order N˜ , which completely blinds xeikik , and A can only ran-
domly guess b′ unless he knows the factorization N = pq.
Then, b′ = b with probability 1/2, and the total probability
Pr[E3] =
Pr[E2]
qc+1
+ qc2(qc+1) . Then, we have:∣∣∣Pr[E2]−Pr[E3]∣∣∣ =∣∣∣(Pr[E2]− 1/2) · qc
qc + 1
∣∣∣
=adv2 · qc
qc + 1
≤ advDDHA
Combining the above inequality with the advantages de-
duced from Game 1 and Game 2, we finally have:
adv2 · qc
qc + 1
= advPDAA · qc
e(qc + 1)2
≤ advDDHA
Lemma 8. Distinguishing Game 3 from Game 2 is at least as
hard as solving a DDH problem for A.
Proof. The only difference between Game 2 and Game 3 is
the oracle’s answers to the encode queries. When µTf = 1,
the answers in Game 3 are exactly same as the ones in Game
2. However, when the failure event F occurs (i.e., µTf = 0),
B answers using H(t)s instead of H(t). Since the values xik
is submitted as a query by A, A knows the value of xik.
Then, distinguishing Game 2 and Game 3 is equivalent to
distinguishing the following two terms:
H(t)q
(|P|−1)(i)Li,P(0) v.s.
(
H(t)s
)q(|P|−1)(i)Li,P(0)
Since H(t) maps t ∈ Z to a cyclic multiplicative group
〈h〉, we let H(t) = hx for some integer x. Let a = x and
b = q(|P|−1)(i)Li,P(0). Given a triple (ha, hb, hc), deciding
whether hc is hab or a random element in Z∗N is exactly
the k-DDH problem. Since s is a uniform random number,
distinguishing between the above two terms is equivalent
to solving this k-DDH problem. However, in Game 3, the
adversary is only given ha except hb, which means distin-
guishing Game 3 from Game 2 is at least as hard as the
k-DDH problem.
Due to Lemma 2, the k-DDH problem is at least as
hard as the DDH problem when k is known. However,
k = φ(N)/N˜ is unknown to A, and therefore the k-DDH
in our group is also at least as hard as the DDH problem for
A.
In conclusion, distinguishing Game 3 from Game 2 is at
least as hard a DDH problem for A.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
6.1 Theoretic Performance: Storage & Communication
Key Storage Complexity: We only require every user to
keep a set of encoding keys EKi = {q(2)(i), · · · , q(n−1)(i)}.
Lagrange coefficients Li,P needed in Encode can be locally
computed when P of the analysis is declared. Therefore, the
storage complexity is O(n), where n is the total number of
users. To the best of our knowledge, there is no sub-linear
solution under the same threat model and performance
requirement (Section 8).
Communication Overhead: The communication overhead
for evaluating a certain polynomial f(xP) in terms of
transmitted bits is summarized in the Table 1. κ is the bit-
length of the safe prime numbers used in our scheme, n′
is the number of new users added into the system, m is
the total number of product terms in the polynomial (Eq.
(1)), and θmin is the minimum threshold of the number of
participants in the evaluation.
TABLE 1
Communication Overhead
Algorithm Send (bits) Receive (bits)
Authority
Aggregate 0 O(mκ)
Special User 1
KeyGen when k users collude O(kn2κ) O(kn2κ)
Encode O(mκ) O(θminmκ)
Adding n′ users O(n′n) O(n′n)
Other participants including Special User 2
KeyGen when k users collude O(kn2κ) O(kn2κ)
Encode O(mκ) 0
Adding n′ users O(n′n) O(n′n)
User 1 with special role has to receive all other users’
communication strings to generate the homomorphic ci-
phertexts, and his communication overhead is θmin times
greater. Besides, we only need two communication rounds
for each polynomial evaluation, which is a constant irrel-
evant to the number of participants. Specifically, everyone
except user 1 sends out his data in the first round, and
user 1 broadcasts the homomorphic ciphertext in the second
round. Finally, when κ = 512, the actual size of an en-
coded value C(xik) is 256B, and a homomorphic ciphertext
E(C(x2k)) is 512B.
96.2 Practical Performance: Computation
To evaluate the computation overhead, we implemented our
scheme in Ubuntu 12.04 using the GMP library (gmplib.org)
based on C in a computer with Intel i3-2365M CPU @
2.80 GHz ×2, Memory 3GB. To exclude the communication
overhead from the measurement, we generated all the com-
munication strings as files in one computer and conducted
all the computation locally (I/O overhead excluded in the
measurement). Security parameter κ is set as 512 bits to
achieve strong prime numbers (the moduli N, N˜ are around
1024 bits). Paillier’s cryptosystem is employed as the homo-
morphic encryption in Encode, which is also implemented
in C.
Microbenchmark
We first perform a series of microbenchmarks to measure the
basic cost units of our scheme as in Table 2. Overhead of the
Encode and Decode algorithms depend on the polynomial
to be evaluated, so we randomly chose a poylnomial with
single product term having 10,000 participants to measure
the exact run time of each algorithm (Table 2).
TABLE 2
Basic Cost Units
Algorithm Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Authority
Aggregate 0.25ms 0.31ms 0.28ms 0.01ms
Special user 1
Encode 9.7ms 10.1ms 9.846ms 0.057ms
Special user 2
Encode 9.4ms 9.6ms 9.458ms 0.053ms
Other participants
Encode 0.115ms 0.145ms 0.129ms 0.0186ms
User 1’s and 2’s overhead is more expensive than other
users because they conduct operations in both Z∗N (1024 bits)
and Z∗N2 (2048 bits) while other users’ operations are closed
only in Z∗N . Besides, the aggregator’s overhead is cheaper
than user 1’s or 2’s because he only performs multiplications
which are much cheaper than exponentiations.
As discussed in Section 7.4, User 1’s overhead is affected
by the number of actual participants in each product. Also,
it is clear that the overall overhead is related to the number
of products in the polynomial. To evaluate the scalability
w.r.t. those parameters, we execute the Encode algorithm
and Aggregate algorithm for randomly chosen polynomials
with different parameters (Figure 1).
In Figure 1(a), x-axis is the minimum threshold, y-axis is
the number of product terms in a polynomial, and z-axis is
the run time. In Figure 1(b) and 1(c), x-axis is the number of
product terms in a polynomial, and y-axis is the run time.
Clearly, the run time of Encode grows bilinearly w.r.t. the
parameters for the special-role user 1, therefore, when either
parameter is large, one should employ a cloud server to act
as the special user 1 since an ordinary user may not be able
to handle such huge computation. The run time of Encode
grows linearly w.r.t. the number of product terms for other
users (Figure 1(b)), and the same applies for Aggreate for
the aggregator. Note that the performance is more sensitive
to the number of products because it is equal to the number
of exponentiations in Z∗N2 , which is much more expensive
than the multiplications.
Data Analysis via PDA
In this section, we obtain various datasets available online
(UCI machine learning datasets [4], SNAP Amazon Movie
Review [49], SNAP Amazon Product Review [48]), and
conduct various analysis on them as described in Section
4.5 to show the generality of our framework as well as its
performance. Note that the run times shown below are the
overall run time when all the computations are conducted
in a laptop computer, and they are not the run times per
user. The actual run time for non-special user is almost
negligible because the special users’ overhead contribute to
the majority of the run time as analyzed above.
Statistics Calculation: As aforementioned (Section 4.5),
various statistics analysis are represented as polynomials,
which can be directly evaluated by our scheme. To compare
the performance with peer works, we implemented three
schemes Shi [54], Joye [40], and Jung [41] in the same
environment, whose purpose is to calculate a product or
a sum on a private dataset. Due to this limitation, these
schemes can be used to calculate simple statistic values
only (e.g., mean, standard deviation), and we compared the
overall run time of the mean calculation on random values
as most of the statistics analysis supported by [40], [41],
[54] are based on mean calculation. The entire calculation
is conducted on a laptop computer to measure the pure
computation overhead only, and the security parameter of
each scheme is chosen such that all schemes have the similar
security level (≈80-bit security level).
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Fig. 2. Comparisons of mean calculation
As shown in Figure 2, the overhead of our scheme is
comparable to the one of Joye [40], and is twice of the
ones of Shi [54] and Jung [41]. The main factor of this
gap is the bit-length of the moduli. When bit-security levels
are comparable to each other, the bit-lengths of the largest
moduli in Shi [54] and Jung [41] are as twice large as the
ones in Joye [40]. Although our performance is not the
best among these four schemes, other schemes can only let
an aggregator obliviously evaluate the product or the sum
over a fixed dataset. Considering our scheme’s generality
which enables an aggregator obliviously evaluate general
multivariate polynomials over arbitrary subset of datasets
(with the support of new user arrival and old user removal),
we claim that this performance gap is acceptable.
Regression Analysis: We trained a linear regression model
over the datasets in a privacy-preserving manner using
our scheme (Section 4.5), and measured the communication
overhead for each ordinary user as well as the overall run
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Fig. 1. Run time of different algorithms for different roles.
time of the entire training in a local computer (Table 3).
Specifically, in SNAP datasets, we counted the number of
‘good’ strings (e.g., ‘I love’, ‘I like’, ‘best’) and ‘bad’ strings
(e.g., ‘I hate’, ‘terrible’) in the review, and treated those
numbers as well as the price as the features. We further
treated the score rating as the dependent variable.
TABLE 3
Linear Regression on Datasets
Datasets Records # Feature # Comm. Time
UCI Dataset
Adult 48,842 14 237KB 355s
Bank 45,211 17 344KB 341s
Insurance 9,822 14 236KB 74s
White wine 4,898 11 148KB 33s
Red wine 1,599 11 148KB 12s
SNAP Dataset
Arts 28K 3 13KB 210s
Books 13M 3 13KB 26h
Games 463K 3 13KB 0.9h
Movie 8M 3 13KB 11h
Moreover, we compare our performance with a simi-
lar work [51] which designed a privacy-preserving ridge
regression over millions of private data records (Table 4).
As we failed to obtain the source codes of their scheme,
we perform the comparison based on the statistics provided
in their paper. This is not a completely fair comparison of
the different computing environment. However, PDA sup-
ports any polynomial-based data analysis while [51] only
supports the ridge regression, therefore we claim that our
solution is more preferable if the performance of our general
solution is comparable to the ad hoc solution.
TABLE 4
Comparison with [51]
Ridge Regression Insurance Red wine White wine
[51] 55s 39s 45s
Ours 74s 12s 33s
SVM Analysis: We implemented the SMO algorithm [53] in
a privacy preserving manner (Section 4.5) to train a linear
support vector machine over the same datasets (part of UCI
datasets) as those in [53]. Please refer to the paper for the
detailed description of the dataset.
Note that the run time to train a SVM is linear to the
number of iterations until convergence in the SMO algo-
rithm, which heavily depends on the characteristics of the
dataset. Our experiment shows that the SVM training via
PDA has a non-negligible overhead (Table 5), but this is
TABLE 5
SMO on Datasets
Datasets Records # Features # Time
Adult [43] 1,605 14 2.75h
Web [12] 2,477 17 49.75h
inevitable because 1) the run time of plain SMO algorithm
on the same dataset is also of several seconds, and 2) the
inherent complexity of the multiplications and exponentia-
tions over k-bit integers are O(κ2) and O(κ3) respectively,
and the plain SVM without privacy consideration performs
arithmetic operations in double type numbers (8B) while our
framework (with 80-bit security level) performs arithmetic
operations as well as exponentiations on 256B numbers.
To the best of our knowledge, [44] is the first and only
work who presents a privacy-preserving method to train
a SVM over a large number of individual records (most of
similar works study how to train SVM on a small number
of vertically or horizontally partitioned database), but their
work does not evaluate the performance in an real imple-
mentation. Although we were not able to acquire the imple-
mentation, we could indirectly compare our performance
with this only similar work. Their theoretic performance
complexities (computation & communication) in theory are
exponentially greater than ours. Such a gap exists because
they relied on the secure multi-party computation. The
performance gap between the solutions based on secure
multi-party computation and our work discussed in Section
8.1 also tells the performance gap in real implementations is
huge. Therefore, ours can be considered as a development
to their solution which improved the performance aspect by
getting rid of the secure multi-party computation.
7 DISCUSSIONS & ANALYSIS
7.1 Disjoint Time Domains
To be indistinguishable against CPA, our Encode must be
randomized. However, it is not easy to let users achieve
independent but coordinated random masks such that their
aggregation yields a constant if we do not rely on a trusted
center. We use the time slot as the ‘seed’ of our hash function
H(·) to address this challenge.
In the Encode algorithm, H(tk)q
(|P|−1)(i)Li,P ∈ Z∗N is
used to mask the private value xik. As analyzed in the
appendix, such random masks are seemingly random under
the random oracle model. Since the random mask is based
on the hash function H(·) which is deterministic, we require
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a disjoint time domain and forbid the re-use of any time slot
tk. Same time slots yield same randomizers, and this will
allow some polynomial adversaries to have non-negligible
advantages in our game.
7.2 Minimum Threshold for |P|
Since the security of PDA relies on the random masks whose
product or sum is equal to an identity element, we require
the minimum number of users in any polynomial evaluation
should be θmin = 3. Otherwise, a user can trivially deduce
another user’s secret random mask r by inverting his own
random mask r−1 (in multiplicative group). That is, besides
the special user 1&2, we also need one ordinary user partic-
ipating in the evaluation. This is why we calculate the secret
key q(d)(i) in KeyGen algorithm only for d = 2, 3, · · · , n− 1
(recall that q(k)(i) is used when k+1 users participate in the
evaluation).
7.3 Passive Rushing & Collusion Attacks
In previous sections, we intentionally simplified the adver-
sarial model as well as the construction for the readability.
Consequently, the basic construction allows certain attacks.
In this section, we present a countermeasure to achieve a
more complete construction.
In a passive rushing attack, attackers access the messages
sent from others before they choose their random numbers
[30]. Specifically, during the exchanges of Yj in the KeyGen
algorithm, an adversarial user i−1 can send out yi−1 = y−ai+1
to user i (a ∈ Z∗
N˜
) after receiving yi+1. Then, Pi’s random
mask is equal to yi+1y−1i−1 = g˜
(ri+1−(ri+1−a))ri = g˜ari ,
which can be efficiently calculated with i’s public parameter
yi = g˜
ri . This attack does not tamper the final computation
and cannot be detected. With exactly same theory, two
colluding users i + 1 and i − 1 can also easily calculate i’s
secret parameter Yi = g˜(ri+1−ri−1)ri .
However, we can adopt the ideas from [41]. With one
extra round of exchange, we can let each user i have
Yi = (yi+2y
−1
i−1)
ri+1ri , and a passive rushing attacker or
two colluding users will fail to infer a user’s Yi. In gen-
eral, to defend against k colluding passive rushing at-
tackers or k + 1 colluding users, we can have k more
extra rounds of exchanges to let each user i have Yi =(
yri+k+1y
−1
ri−1
)ri+kri+k−1···ri+2ri+1ri .
Recall that we initially assumed non-cooperative users
in this paper. But with the above prevention, we can relax
the assumption and make our PDA resilient to a collusion
attack of up to k − 1 passive rushing attackers or k normal
attackers. As a result, all encoding keys q(2)(i), · · · , q(k)(i)
become unusable. This is because any user’s encoding key
EKi is composed of several data points in hidden polynomi-
als, and k colluding users can deduce the k-degree hidden
polynomial q(k)(x) of 0 constant term. Then, these colluding
users can compute any user i’s encoding key q(k)(i). Thus,
the lowest degree of the usable polynomial is k+ 1, and the
minimum threshold θmin for |P| in the PDA becomes k + 2
(each user uses q(k+1)(i) as the encoding key) to guarantee
the semantic security of PDA. Employment of this counter-
measure translates to multiple extra communication rounds
in KeyGen, but this is a one-time operation at the beginning
of the system initialization.
7.4 Performance Optimization
In the algorithm Encode, we require that everyone should
submit his encoded value C(xik) even though his xik does
not appear in the product term
∏
xeikik (in which case xik
is set as 1). This is because the number of actual partic-
ipating users should be at least a certain threshold θmin
to guarantee the semantic security (reviewed in details in
Section 7.5). However, in some polynomials, single product
terms involve very few users regardless of the total number
of participants |P| of the polynomial, such as f(xP) =∑
i,j∈P xixj . If strictly following Encode, one needs to have
|P|− 1 (encoded) 1’s multiplied for each product term xixj .
However, to preserve the semantic security of the scheme,
we only need θmin users to participate in each single
product term, and this is an unnecessary overhead. This
performance degradation becomes huge when θmin  |P|,
but we can simply get rid of it as follows. Whenever the
number of participants involved in a product term is less
than θmin, randomly find dummy users in P only until we
have θmin users instead of having everyone in P participat-
ing in the analysis. Then, dummy users participate in the
evaluation by providing 1 as their private values, and by
doing so, we only have minimum number of participants for
every product term, which greatly cut off the unnecessary
overhead.
7.5 Limitations & Future Works
Performance Limit: It is shown in Section 6 that user 1’s
communication and computation overhead grows linearly
w.r.t. the actual participants in each product term, which
may become huge in some big data analysis. In such case,
we may add a cloud server to take this role, and let him
provide 1 during the evaluation. Besides, each person needs
to send/receiveO(n2κ) bits (Section 6.1) with small constant
during the one-time operation KeyGen, which may be large
when n is large. This can be reduced with several naı¨ve
ideas, for examples, dividing n users into several subgroups
and forcing the analysis within the subgroups only. But such
ideas disable some types of analysis, and handling this limit
is one of our future works.
Polynomial Parameters: This paper focuses more on user’s
data privacy, and pays less attention to the aggregator’s
privacy. This is why we require that the polynomials should
be public, otherwise aggregators may adaptively design the
polynomial (e.g., f(xP) = x1) to directly infer a user’s
data. However, in some cases, the polynomial parameters
may be proprietary property which also need to be pro-
tected (e.g., data mining techniques), but then corresponding
verification mechanisms should be introduced as well to
enable users to verify whether the polynomial is maliciously
designed, which is one of our future works.
Finite Real Numbers: Although our design supports poly-
nomials over real numbers, the real numbers are represented
via fixed-point representation, which constructs one-to-one
mapping between the real numbers and the integers in the
cyclic group we use as a part of crypto protocols. Therefore,
the real numbers that can be expressed in our system is a
finite set of real numbers whose size is equal to the order of
the group in our algorithms (i.e., N ).
Data Publishing: Our PDA only supports pull-based data
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analysis in which the aggregator requests the data analysis
with the declaration of the polynomial, and then users
publish their data according to it. One thought is to achieve
a push-based analysis, where users publish their data when-
ever it is generated, and the aggregator chooses desired
subset of data and periods to perform the data analysis.
However, once the data is published, it will not be under
the user’s control, and it becomes much more challenging
to protect the privacy. Designing a push-based data analysis
which can prevent malicious analysis on the already pub-
lished data is a very challenging task, and we leave this as
our future work too.
8 RELATED WORK
The purpose of our scheme is to protect the data privacy
rather than the identity privacy. Therefore, we focus more
on reviewing peer works studying the privacy-preserving
data analysis whose purpose is to protect the data confiden-
tiality. In general, related approaches can be categorized into
the following families: approaches based on secure multi-
party computation, perturbation, segmentation, functional
encryption and secret-shared keys.
8.1 Secure Multi-Party Computation
TABLE 7
Comparison of the fastest SMC implementation and ours
5,550 AND via GMW [17] 134 additions via ours
15-20 seconds 0.06-0.08 seconds
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) [57] enables n
parties to jointly and privately compute a function fi(x)
where the result fi is returned to the participant i only. One
can trivially use SMC to enable data analysis on published
sanitized data, but SMC is subject to extraordinarily high
delay in real life implementations. Among various real
implementations on multi-party computation schemes (Fair-
playMP [6], VIFF [23], SEPIA [13], and GMW [17]), even the
fastest GMW [17] does not scale well, whose communication
rounds is linear to the number of users with huge constant
factors, and it takes 15-20 seconds to conduct 5,500 AND
gates evaluation. Similar-size computation in our scheme
only incurs subsecond-level computation time and single-
round communication of several milliseconds (Table 7).
Such huge performance gap is due to the different purposes.
SMC targets at implementing arbitrary computation while
ours target at polynomial-based data analysis only. Consid-
ering the number of users and the volume of data, it is more
practical to rely on schemes specially designed for general
analysis to enable lightweight protocols.
8.2 Perturbation
The perturbation is often leveraged to achieve the differen-
tial or membership privacy ([27], [47]). In such approaches,
a random noise drawn from a known distribution is added
to mask the original data, and some statistics about the
aggregate result can be deduced based on the distribution of
the random noises. These approaches enable certain analysis
on published (sanitized) data (normally without requiring a
trusted key dealer), but the accuracy is dependent on the
guaranteed security (i.e., accuracy increases when security
is sacrificed), and the temporal correlation between the
data leads to a limited utility when the data is time-series.
A´cs et al proposed a privacy-preserving smart metering
system which support various aggregated statistics analysis
without leaking household activities. [1] presented how to
perform Fan et al. [28] presented an adaptive approach
to time-series data releasing with differential privacy, but
their relative error is greater than 10−1 with certain privacy
sacrifice. Recently, Chen et al. [16] presented a scheme based
on perturbation to mine frequent patterns in the form of
substring, but the utility for prefixes is poor due to the
noises making the scheme differentially private. Supported
by the recent demand in the accuracy [38], we claim that,
for some applications in the future, it is not desirable to rely
on the approaches whose accuracy depends on the privacy
requirements of the applications.
8.3 Functional Encryption
Functional encryption [11] is a type of recently proposed
public key encryption in which a certain function of the
plaintext can be derived from the ciphertext if one possesses
a valid private key corresponding to the function. It is pos-
sible to leverage FE to design a solution to our problem, but
the one key is associated with a pre-defined function in FE,
and this key can be used to derive only one function of the
plaintext. In many data mining algorithms, the actual tar-
get analysis functions (classifiers or predictive models) are
trained iteratively, in which each training at each iteration
is another type of function to be evaluated over the private
dataset. Since all such analysis are data-dependent, issued
keys can hardly be re-used, and keys should be issued to
all participants in advance of every data analysis, which is a
communicationally expensive interaction. Furthermore, the
key distribution must be performed via secured channels.
In contrast, our keys can be re-used arbitrarily many
times as long as the time windows for every polynomial
are disjoint with each other.
8.4 Secret-shared Keys
Several schemes distribute certain keys to the data users
such that the sum or product of the keys are constants. Then,
these keys are used to mask the original data. These schemes
are very close to ours.
Shi [54] and Joye [40] let the aggregator compute the
sum of n participants’ data xi’s without learning anything
else. They both let a trusted third party generate random
keys si for the i-th participant such that
∑
si = 0. Then,
it follows that
∏
H(t)si = 1, where H(·) is a hash function
employed as a random oracle and t is the time slot when the
calculation is carried out. Then, this property is used by both
schemes to compute the sum
∑
xi, and both of them are
proved to be semantically secure against chosen-plaintext
attack. However, both of the schemes rely on a trusted key
issuer, and the data is not confidential against him. Further-
more, only the product or sum calculation is enabled, which
makes it less suitable for a general data analysis. Jung [41],
[42] removed the necessity of a trusted key dealer in their
settings, and their scheme enables both product and sum
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TABLE 6
Comparisons
Approach based on Storage Complexity Communication Rounds Accurate result? Rely on secure channel?
Multi-party Computation High O(n)∗ Yes No
Perturbation O(1) O(1) No No
Functional Encryption High O(1) Yes Yes
Secret-shared Keys O(2n) O(1) Yes Yes, except [41], [42]
Ours O(n) O(1) Yes No
*This is the best known complexity, and every gate in the circuit incurs one round of oblivious transfer.
calculations. They also mention the possibility of evaluating
some multivariate polynomials, but all the product terms
in the polynomials are revealed to the aggregator. More
importantly, the hardness of breaking their scheme reduces
to computational diffie-hellman (CDH) problem only, which
makes their scheme one-way but not semantically secure.
These four schemes based on secret-shared keys are close
to our solution, but all the schemes need a fixed group and
assign a set of secret keys, which means for a set of n users,
one needs to let all users hold θ(2n) keys to conduct data
analysis among any subgroup of them, which violates the
flexibility requirement.
As a summary, the comparisons of all aforementioned
approaches and ours are shown in the Table 6.
8.5 Secure Multivariate Polynomial Evaluation
To the best of our knowledge, [9], [22], [31], [42] are the
only four works who study the secure multi-party com-
putation on multivariate polynomial evaluation. First of
all, the solution in [42] reveals all single product terms in
the polynomial, and it leaks much information about the
private values. [31] focused on a polynomial of degree 3, and
points out that this can be generalized to a higher degree.
However, in higher degrees, the communication overhead
is not optimal. Subsequently, [22] presented a more effi-
cient scheme with the unicast complexity O(κm2n log d)
and broadcast complexity O(κm3(log d)2) (untight bound
for simplicity), where κ is the security parameter, m is
the number of product terms in the polynomial, n is the
number of participants, and d is the highest degree of the
polynomial. Also, their communication rounds is a constant
in terms of the ‘round table’ rounds, which is linear to the
number of users. In our framework, the unicast complexity
for each evaluation is only O(θminmκ) for the special user
(θmin being the minimum threshold for the number of
participants) and O(mκ) for other participants, and there
is no broadcast overhead. Also, the communication round
is a constant irrelevant to the number of participants in
the evaluation. Besides, [9] also discusses how to compute
limited families of polynomials, but the rounds complexity
is O(l log l) where l is the bit-length of the inputs.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we successfully designed PDA, a general
framework which enables a third-party aggregator to per-
form many types of polynomial-based data analysis on
private data records, where the data records are possessed
by millions of users. Namely, our framework enables the ag-
gregator to evaluate various multivariate polynomials over
any subgroup of users’ private data without learning indi-
viduals’ input values, and it also supports new users to join
the system and old users to leave the system. Our formal
proof shows the semantic security of PDA against chosen-
plaintext attacks, and the extensive evaluations show that
PDA incurs constant overhead regardless of the total num-
ber of users or the complexity of the polynomial. Besides,
PDA also exhibits various nice properties (design goals in
Section 1) which make it suitable for real life applications.
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